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1KILL THE MONSTER:PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AS
AN INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION
SUSAN LORDE MARTIN*
ABSTRACT
Contract rules may be dissolving into tort-type notions of un-
fairness and injustice. Traditionally, promissory estoppel was viewed
as a substitute for consideration in situations where promisors
made promises knowing that promisees would act in reliance on
them, the promisees did act on the promises, and the promisors
refused to do what they promised to do, to the promisees detriment. 
The purpose of promissory estoppel was clearly one of fairness
and preventing injustice by enforcing a promise not supported by
consideration in very limited circumstances. In recent cases,
however, courts have been approving the use of promissory estop-
pel as an independent cause of action to provide remedies for al-
leged contracts that otherwise would be unenforceable.
If contract rules are frequently displaced by ad hoc decisions
about unfairness, the predictability and reliability of business
transactions will diminish to the detriment of all who engage in
them. This Article will review the development of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel and the variations in its acceptance among
the states. It will consider the classification of promissory estop-
pel as an action at law or in equity and the doctrines weakening 
of traditional contract rules, particularly the statute of frauds. This
Article concludes that it is not in the interest of businesspeople for
their contractual obligations to be governed by the communitys 
shared sense of fairness rather than their specific bargained-for 
exchanges of promises, as governed by classic contract rules. The
former provides no reliability or predictability, just confusion
and more opportunity for litigation.
* CypresFamilyDistinguished ProfessorofLegalStudiesin Business, Zarb
SchoolofBusiness, Hofstra University. Research forthisarticlewassupported
byaZarbSchoolSummerResearchGrant.
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INTRODUCTION
A dissentingjusticein aTexasCourtofAppealscastigatedhis
courts majority for legislating from the bench and creating a mon-
ster: promissory estoppel as a free standing cause of action.1 He
advised killing it now before it kills m any other causes of ac-
tion.2 Thistwenty-firstcentury casebringstom ind GrantGil-
m ores 1974 book The Death of Contract,3 in which Professor
Gilmore argued that contract law may be swallowed up by tort4
because of the effective dismantling of the formal system of classi-
cal contract theory.5 Henoted, forexample, thatthedoctrineof
promissoryestoppelmaybeovercomingbasiccontractprinciples
likethestatuteoffrauds, statutesoflimitation, andtheparolevi-
dencerule.6
A review ofcaseswherecourtshaveconsideredthedoctrineof
promissory estoppelsuggeststhat, in fact, contractrulesmaybe
dissolvingintotort-typenotionsofunfairnessand injustice. Tra-
ditionally, promissoryestoppelwasviewedasasubstituteforcon-
sideration in situationswherepromisorsmadepromisesknowing
thatpromiseeswouldactinrelianceonthem, thepromiseesdidact
on the promises, and to the promisees detrim ent, the promisors 
1 FrostCrushedStoneCo. v. OdellGeerConstr. Co., 110 S.W.3d41, 48 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2002)(Gray, J., dissenting).
2 Id.
3 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974)(Ronald K. L. Collins
ed., 1995).
4 Id. at103.
5 Id. at72.
6 Id. at 73. In fact, courts have uniformly disallowed the doctrine of
promissoryestoppeltoovercometheparolevidencerule. See, e.g., Newpaper,
LLC v. PartyCityCorp., No. 13-1735 ADM/LIB, 2014WL 2986653, at*9 (D.
Minn. July 1, 2014);Adler v. Elk Glenn, LLC, No. 12-85-ART, 2013 WL
6632057, at *9 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 17, 2013); Hofer v. Liberty Natl Bank, No. CIV 
11-4129-KES, 2012 WL 5945169, at*6 (D.S.D. Nov. 28, 2012);Prentice v.
UDC AdvisoryServ., Inc., 648 N.E.2d146, 153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995);Mishlerv.
Hale, 26 N.E.3d 1260, 1270 (OhioCt. App. 2014);Big G Corp. v. Henry, 536
A.2d 559, 562 (Vt. 1987). Courts have in few instancesallowed promissory
estoppelclaimstogoforwardwhen statutesoflimitationshaverun. See, e.g.,
Huddleston v. Huddleston, No. CIV-14-597-R, 2014WL 5317922, at*3 (W.D.
Okla. Oct. 16, 2014);GE MobileWater, Inc. v. RedDesertReclamation, LLC,
6 F. Supp. 3d195, 202 (D.N.H. 2014).
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refusetodowhattheypromisedtodo.7 Thepurposeofpromissory
estoppelwas clearly one offairness and preventing injustice by
enforcing a promisenotsupported by consideration in verylim-
ited circum stances.8 In recentcases, however, courtshavebeen
approvingtheuseofpromissoryestoppelasan independentcause
ofaction toprovideremediesforallegedcontractsthatotherwise
wouldbeunenforceable.9
Ifcontractrulesarefrequentlydisplaced byad hocdecisions
aboutunfairness, the predictability and reliability ofbusiness
transactionswilldiminish tothedetrim entofallwhoengagein
them. Although thereisfrequentdiscussion in legislaturesand
newspapers abouttortreform 10 that is, m aking it harder for 
plaintiffstowin negligenceand strictliability casesagainstbusi-
ness defendants one rarely hears aboutcontractreform. But
being abletorely on contractsentered intowith theknowledge
thattraditionalcontractlaw ruleswillapply and notbedistorted
oreliminatedbyfact-sensitivetort-typeconsiderationsmaybea
similarlyim portantlegalissueforbusinessestoconsider.
7 See, e.g., Rickettsv. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365, 367 (Neb. 1898)(calling it
equitable estoppel but defining prom issory estoppel: Having intentionally 
influenced theplaintifftoalterherposition fortheworseon thefaith ofthe
note being paid when due, it would be grossly inequitable to permit the
maker, orhisexecutor, toresistpaym enton thegroundthatthepromisewas
given without consideration.); see also Kahn v. CeceliaCo., 40 F. Supp. 878,
879 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (noting that prom issory estoppel, a doctrine of com -
paratively recent origin, is usually a substitute for consideration with 
limitedapplicationinNew York).
8 See, e.g., ChryslerCorp. v. ChaplakeHoldings, Ltd., 822 A.2d1024, 1031,
1034 (Del. 2003) (noting that prevention of injustice is the fundam ental 
idea underlying the doctrine of prom issory estoppel); Faim on v. Winona 
StateUniv., 540 N.W.2d879, 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)(citingRESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §90(1)(1981)).
9 See, e.g., Alaska Dem ocratic Party v. Rice, 934 P.2d 1313, 131617 
(Alaska 1997)(holding thatpromissory estoppelcould overcomea statuteof
frauds defense in employmentcases);Traco, Inc. v. Arrow Glass Co., 814
S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)(holdingthatpromissoryestoppelisan
independentcauseofactioninbidconstructioncases).
10 See, e.g., KimberleyA. Strassel, Op-Ed., A Silver Lining in Washington,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2015, atA11 (notingthatNew York HouseRepublicans
will reintroduce important tort-reform  bill); Allysia Finley, Op-Ed., Behind
the GOP Statehouse Juggernaut, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1314, 2014, at A11 
(noting that passing tort reform  will be a hot issue in m any states). 
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This Article willreview the developmentofthe doctrine of
promissory estoppel11 and thevariationsin itsacceptanceamong
thestates. Itwillconsidertheclassification ofpromissoryestop-
pel as an action at law or in equity and the doctrines weakening 
oftraditionalcontractrules, particularly the statute offrauds.
An exam ination ofcases discussing the doctrine ofprom issory
estoppelindicatestheconfusion thatexistsaboutthistopicand
thewiderangeofopinionsand conclusionsam ongcourts.12 This
Articleconcludesthatitisnotin theinterestofbusinesspeople
for their contractual obligations to be governed by the commu-
nitys shared sense of fairness13 ratherthan theirspecificbar-
gained-forexchangesofpromisesasgovernedbyclassiccontract
rules.14 Theformerprovidesnoreliability orpredictability, just
11 A greatdealhasbeen written aboutthedoctrineofpromissoryestoppel.
See, e.g., Charles Calleros, Cause, Consideration, Promissory Estoppel, and
Promises Under Deed: What Our Students Should Know about Enforcement of
Promises in A Historical and International Context, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTL &
COMP. L. 83, 101 (2013);JenniferCamero, Zombieland: Seeking Refuge from
the Statute of Frauds in Contracts for the Sale of Services or Goods, 82 UMKC
L. REV. 1, 18 (2013);Gerald Caplan, Legal Autopsies: Assessing the Per-
formance of Judges and Lawyers Through the Window of Leading Contract
Cases, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1, 1217 (2009); Gina M. Chang, Note, McInerney v.
Charter Golf, Inc.: The Court Swings and Misses, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 907,
908 (1998);David G. Epstein etal., Contract Laws Two P.E.s: Promissory 
Estoppel and the Parol Evidence Rule, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 397, 398 (2010);
David J. Gass, Michigans UCC Statute of Frauds and Promissory Estoppel,
74MICH. B.J. 524, 524(June1995);EricMillsHolmes, Restatement of Prom-
issory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263, 26566 (1996); Marco J. 
Jimenez, The Many Faces of Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical Analysis
Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA L. REV. 669, 66970 
(2010);NicholasJ. Johnson, The Statutory UCC: Interpretative License and
Duty under Article 2, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 1073, 112224 (2012); Stephen J. 
Leacock, Fingerprints of Equitable Estoppel and Promissory Estoppel on the
Statute of Frauds in Contract Law, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 73, 73 (2011);
MichaelB. Metzger & MichaelJ. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Third
Parties, 42 SW. L.J. 931, 39192 (1988). 
12 See, e.g., Aaron R. Petty, The Reliance Interest in Restitution, 32 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 365, 38283 (2008) (asserting confusion about doctrine of prom issory 
estoppelandvariationam ongcourtsinapplyingit).
13 CharlesFried, Aziyah: The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1858, 1858 (1980)(reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979)).
14 Forextensivetheoreticaldiscussionsofthisissue, seeCHARLES FRIED, CON-
TRACT AS PROMISE:A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981);Anthony
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moreopportunityforlitigation. Italsocreatesa greatdealofcon-
fusion forbusinesseswhencourtsindifferentstates, andevenstate
and federalcourtsin thesamestate, takesuch variedapproaches
totheprom issoryestoppeldoctrine. Therefore, statelegislatures
shouldconsiderenactingpromissoryestoppelstatutesthatprovide
forthedoctrinetoactonlyasaconsiderationsubstituteundercer-
tain limitedcircum stances, soastocreatean enforceablecontract
thatissubjecttotraditionalcontractrules. Injusticespropagated
byenforcementofcontractrulescan bealleviatedbyotherexist-
ingdoctrinessuchaspartperformance15 andunconscionability.16
I. THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
In the United States, a traditionalrequirem ent ofan en-
forceablecontractisconsideration thathasbeen bargainedfor.17
Thatis, each partymustpromiseeithertoactortorefrain from
acting to induce the otherparty to do likewise.18 Situations in
which prom issoryestoppelwasfirstapplied occurred when lack
of consideration would have precluded a prom ise from being
enforced.19 However, the additionalcircumstancesofdetrimental
reliance on a promise thatwasm ade, knowing itwould induce
action, m adethefailuretoenforcetheprom iseseem unjust.20 To
remedythissituation, courtslookedtoestoppel.
TownsendKronman, A New Champion for the Will Theory, 91 YALE L.J. 404,
406 (1981)(reviewing CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE:A THEORY OF
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981)).
15 See, e.g., MessnerVetereBergerMcNam eeSchmettererEuroRSCG Inc.
v. Aegis Group plc, 711 N.E.2d 953, 956 (N.Y. 1999) (part performance
doctrinebased on equitableprinciplesand applied when itwould bea fraud
toallow a party toan oralcontractto escape perform ance after perm itting 
the other party to perform  in reliance on the agreem ent). 
16 See, e.g., Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170, 176 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1979)(notingthatunconscionabilitydoctrineisappliedtopreventinjusticewhen
bargain involving disadvantaged persons is very one-sided orunreasonable
butgenerallynotavailabletomerchants).
17 Sfreddo v. Sfreddo, 720 S.E.2d 145, 154 (Va. Ct. App. 2012);RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §71(1)(1981);DonaldJ. Smythe, The Scope of a
Bargain and the Value of a Promise, 60 S.C. L. REV. 203, 20506 (2008). 
18 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §75 cmt. b(1932).
19 MerexA.G. v. FairchildWestonSyst., Inc., 29 F.3d821, 824(2dCir. 1994).
20 Id.
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Sam uelWilliston, the chiefreporterforthe Restatementof
Contracts,21 spoke of genuine estoppel as a rule that says one 
whohasled anothertoactin reasonable relianceon hisrepre-
sentations offact cannot afterwards in litigation between the
two deny the truth of the representations.22 Thisshield from a
wrongdoers misrepresentations hascome to be known asequi-
tableestoppelandhasbeen appliedbycourtsin theUnitedStates
form ore than 150 years.23 In thisform ulation, courtsused es-
toppelto protectan innocentparty who had been misled about
thefacts(notpromisesorintentions)ofa dealand, becauseofa
misrepresentation offacts, could nothaveprotectedhimselfin a
contract.24 Equitable estoppelwasnotbeing used asa cause of
action, butasa defenseby an innocentparty when a misrepre-
senteroffactsattem ptedtoenforceacontract.25
In his 1920 treatise on contracts, Professor Williston noted
thatsom ecourtswereusing theprincipleofestoppeltoenforce
an otherwisenonexistentcontractualobligation when therewas
nomisrepresentation offact.26 Instead, a prom iseesuffered det-
rim entby relying on a gratuitous prom ise, noton a m isstate-
mentoffact.27 Hegaveexamplesofthisuseofestoppelin cases
involving charitable subscriptions; gratuitous debtors promises 
topay, inducingcreditorsnottobringan action untilthestatute
oflimitationshadrun;andgratuitouspromisestoselllandornot
toforecloseam ortgagewhen apromiseem adeim provementson
theproperty.28 Heofferedthatinsuchcases, wheretheprom isee
isrelyingon apromise, notamisstatementoffact, an appropriate
term todescribeitshouldbepromissory estoppel or som ething 
equivalent to mark the distinction.29 In 1932, Judge Learned
21 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932).
22 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §139 (1920).
23 See, e.g., MajorLeagueBaseballv. Morsani, 790 So. 2d1071, 1077 (Fla.
2001);Cooglerv. Rogers, 7 So. 391, 394 (1889);Camp v. Moseley, 2 Fla. 171,
171 (1848).
24 JoelM. Ngugi, Promissory Estoppel: The Life History of an Ideal Legal
Transplant, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 425, 45758 (2007). 
25 Hoyev. WestfieldIns. Co., 487 N.W.2d838, 842 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
26 WILLISTON, supra note22.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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Hand concluded that promissory estoppel was a recognized spe-
cies of consideration.30
Through recent tim es, som e courts seem to have difficulty
characterizing prom issory estoppelso that it fits in accepted
legalparadigms. In 2006, theUnited StatesDistrictCourtforthe
Middle District of Alabama declared that the full contours of the 
doctrineofprom issory estoppelareill-defined and stilldevelop-
ing as part of Alabam as comm on law.31 More than thirty-five
yearsago, the MassachusettsSuprem e JudicialCourtdeclared
thatitwould notusetheterm promissory estoppel because it 
causesconfusion.32 Through theyears, courtsinterpreting Mas-
sachusettslaw havecited thatsentiment.33 Nevertheless, Mas-
sachusettscourtshave enforced prom isesbased on detrim ental
reliance, characterizingthem as contracts enforceable pursuant 
to a traditional contract theoryantedatingthemodern doctrine
of consideration.34 One Massachusetts court held that [p]rom-
issory estoppelis notan independentcause ofaction. Itis an
alternativemethod ofestablishing consideration sufficienttocre-
ate a contract.35 A Texasappellatecourthassaidthatpromissory
estoppeldoesnotcreatea contractwherenoneexisted before,36
while the United States DistrictCourtin Maryland, applying
Maryland law, hassaid thatprom issoryestoppelpermitsrecov-
erywherethereisnocontract.37
30 Porter v. Comm r R. 10.2.1(i), 60 F.2d 673, 675 (2d Cir. 1932). 
31 Sykesv. Payton, 441 F. Supp. 2d1220, 1223 (M.D. Ala. 2006).
32 LorangerConstr. Corp. v. E. F. Hauserm an Co., 384 N.E.2d 176, 179
(Mass. 1978).
33 See, e.g., Oz Holding LCC v. Elm Court Realty LLC, No. 09 Civ.
7427(PGG), 2010 WL 2730476, at*4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2010)(applying
Massachusetts law and noting that Massachusetts does not use the label
prom issory estoppel); R.I. Hosp. Trust Natl Bank v. Varadian, 647 N.E.2d 
1174, 1179 (Mass. 1995)(noting thatthe jurisdiction does notuse the ex-
pression prom issory estoppel). 
34 LorangerConstr. Corp. v. E. F. Hauserm an Co., 384 N.E.2d 176, 179
(Mass. 1978);Pease v. Jernigan, 2014 Mass. App. Div. 169, 171 (2014);
Spectrum Sales, Inc. v. Cobham Def. Elec. Sys., No. MICV201303349, 2014
WL 1758109, at*5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2014).
35 Lombardo v. Mauriello, No. 990390F, 2002 WL 31492393, at *3 n.6
(Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2002).
36 Maddoxv. VantageEnergy, LLC, 361 S.W.3d752, 761 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012).
37 Odyssey TravelCtr., Inc. v. RO Cruises, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 618, 626
(D. Md. 2003).
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Many courts have confronted the issue ofusing prom issory
estoppel as a sword that is, as an independent cause of action 
toenforceanotherwiseunenforceablepromise, ratherthanmerely
as a shield to avoid disadvantaging a promisee who did not 
giveconsideration tosupporta promisebutwhoreasonably re-
lied on the prom ise to his or her detriment.38 Courts in some
stateshaveheld thatpromissoryestoppelisnotan independent
cause ofaction atall.39 The Virginia Supreme Courthas held
thatprom issory estoppelisnotan independentcause ofaction
in the Comm onwealth.40 The United States District Court in
Oregon hasheld in an em ploym entcasethatprom issory estop-
pelisonly a substituteforconsideration and cannotbeused as
an independentcauseofaction.41
On the otherhand, theUnited StatesDistrictCourtforthe
Eastern DistrictofMichigan hasnoted thatalthough Michigan
does not recognize an independent cause of action for detri-
mental reliance, it does recognize prom issory estoppel of which 
detrim ental reliance is an element as a distinct cause of ac-
tion.42 Michigan courtshavedescribed prom issory estoppelasa
tort that is akin to a contract claim .43
In Texas, an appellatecourtdeclared thatprom issory estop-
pelcan actonlyasa defensein som econtexts, butcan serveas
an independentcauseofaction in others.44 Thecourtsaid itcan
38 Jablonv. UnitedStates, 657 F.2d1064, 1068 (9thCir. 1981).
39 SuburbanHosp., Inc. v. Sampson, 807 F. Supp. 31, 33 (D. Md. 1992).
40 Guardian Pharmacy v. WeberCity Healthcare, No. 2:12cv00037, 2013
WL 277771, at*7 (W.D. Va. Jan. 24, 2013);Nasserv. WhitePages, Inc., No.
5:12cv097, 2013 WL 6147677, at*5 (W.D. Va. Nov. 22, 2013);W.J. Schafer
Assocs. v. CordantInc., 493 S.E.2d512, 516 (Va. 1997).
41 Ryman v. Sears, Roebuck& Co., No. 05-CV-1106-BR, 2006 WL 1720534,
at*7 (D. Or. June 19, 2006). The Oregon CourtofAppealshasstated that
[i]n Oregon, it is well recognized that prom issory estoppel is not a cause of 
action in itself, but is a subset and a theoryofrecoveryin breach ofcontract
actions. Neiss v. Ehlers, 899 P.2d 700, 706 (Or. Ct. App. 1995). See also
Barnesv. Yahoo, Inc., 570 F.3d1096, 1106 (9thCir. 2009)(notingthatinOregon
and m ost other states, prom issory estoppel is a subset of a theory of recovery 
basedonabreachofcontractandserves as a substitute for consideration). 
42 1200 Sixth St., LLC v. United States, 848 F. Supp. 2d 767, 776 (E.D.
Mich. 2012).
43 Id. at 777 (quoting Byrne v. Republic Bank, No. 268762, 2007 WL
2560467, at*4n.2 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2007)).
44 Lotitov. KnifeRiverCorp., 391 S.W.3d226, 227 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012).
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be used only as a shield, not a sword, and concluded that in the 
employmentcontext, promissoryestoppelisadefensethatprevents
a promisorfrom avoidinga contractthatfallsunderthestatute
offrauds.45 Thecourtdidnotclarifywhyan action toforcean em-
ployertohireanemployeebecauseofapromisethatwasnotmade
in writingasrequiredbycontractruleswasm erelyadefense.46
In bid construction cases, Texascourtshaveheld thatprom -
issoryestoppelcan bean independentcauseofaction.47 In Frost
Crushed Stone Co. v. Odell Geer Construction Co.,48 Geersubmit-
ted a bid asa subcontractorto supply rock fora highway proj-
ect.49 GeerallegedthatFrostagreedinatelephoneconversationto
supplytherock fortheproject, andafterthatconversation, Geer
contracted with Texas Trucking Com pany to haulthe rock if
Geers bid was successful.50 After Geers bid was accepted, Frost 
sentGeera written price quote forthe rock and Geersigned a
contractwith TexasTrucking Com pany tohaultherock.51 Sev-
eralm onthslater, Frostinform ed Geerthatitwould notbeable
tosupply therock.52 Geersued Frostundera theory ofpromis-
sory estoppel, interalia, alleging thatFrostpromised tosupply
the rock knowing Geerwould rely on the promise and, in fact,
Geer did rely on it in signing a hauling contract with Texas
TruckingCompany.53 The court held that Geer was seeking af-
firmative reliefunder the equitable doctrine ofpromissory es-
toppel based on the premise that it detrim entally relied on
Frosts oral bid, and that Geer was entitled to the am ount nec-
essary to restore him to the position in which he would have
been had henotrelied on [Frosts] promise.54 Thisresultseems
unfairtothesubcontractorFrostbecauseGeercould havewalked
away from theirdealatany tim e up untilitbegan working on
the highway project, butFrostdid nothave the sam e option.55
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.;Traco, Inc. v. Arrow GlassCo., 814S.W.2d186, 189 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
48 110 S.W.3d41 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
49 Id. at44.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 4546. 
54 Id. at 4647. 
55 Id. at44.
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Geercouldhaveprotecteditselffrom Frosts failure to deliver by 
signing a written agreementwith Frost. UndertheFrost prom-
issory estoppeldecision, Geer gets to have itboth ways:Geer
can decidenottodo businesswith Frost, butFrostisobligated
todowhatitprom isedtodo.56
Unlikethepurported law in Texasregarding promissory es-
toppelin employm entcases, in Verm ont, prom issoryestoppelis
an independentcauseofaction thatcan beusedtom odifyan at-
willemploymentrelationshipandprovidearemedyforwrongful
discharge.57 In Foote v. Simmonds Precision Products Company,
Footeallegedthathewasdischarged becauseheused thegriev-
ance procedure described in the com panys employee hand-
book.58 Thehandbook promised em ployeesthatifthey followed
the procedure, they would not be criticized or penalized in any 
way.59 Footefollowed theprocedure, wasfired, and claimed that
herelied on thisprom iseofnon-retaliation.60 TheVermontSu-
prem e Court concluded that an employer who makes such a
statem entin an em ployeehandbook should expect action or for-
bearance on the part of the promisee as a result of the statement, 
and that promissory estoppel could serve as an independent
causeofaction, m odify an at-willemploymentrelationship, and
provide a remedy for wrongfulterm ination.61 The plaintiffin
this case also broughtactions under express and implied con-
tracttheories, butthejury based itsverdictonly on prom issory
estoppel, and the Verm ont Supreme Court affirm ed the deci-
sion.62 Itisunderstandablethatalayjurywould find an appeal
tojusticeand fairnessattractive, butthiscasecould havebeen
decidedbasedon thecontractcreatedbytheemployeehandbook
forallemployees, including those serving atwill. Itisunfortu-
nate thatthe courtallowed prom issory estoppelto be used in
this kind ofcase, when traditionalcontract rules could have
createdthesameresult.
56 Id. at46.
57 Footev. SimmondsPrecisionProds. Co., 613 A.2d1277, 1280 (Vt. 1992).
58 Id. at1278.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 128081. See also Madden v. Omega Optical, Inc., 683 A.2d 386,
392 (Vt. 1996)(holding thatpromissory estoppelmay modify at-willemploy-
mentrelationship).
62 Foote, 613 A.2dat1278.
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In 2010, alowercourtin Vermontdescribed promissoryestop-
pel as a well established[,]   valid and independent cause of action 
thatm ayberaisedbyat-willemployeesin ordertoprovewrong-
ful discharge.63 Thelaw in Iowaissim ilar.64 TheIowaSupreme
Court, in a caseoffirstim pression considering whetherpromis-
soryestoppelisavailablein at-willemploymentcases, quotedcases
stating that [p]rom issory estoppel is now a recognized species 
of consideration,65 and in promissory estoppel claim s, detri-
m ental reliance on one side will suffice as consideration.66 The
court concluded that [p]romissory estoppel is simply another the-
ory by which an em ployer m ay be held to his promise, and noth-
ing aboutat-willemployment precludes that.67 Here, the court
attem pted toadhere to the traditionaluseofprom issory estop-
pelasa substituteforconsideration, butstretched themeaning
ofconsideration todoso.68
TheSupremeCourtofDelawarehasmaintained theoriginal
notion ofprom issory estoppelas a consideration substitute in 
cases where a contract has not been form ed,69 and its funda-
mental idea is the prevention of injustice.70 In Delaware, prom-
issory estoppelcan bepled asan independentcauseofaction.71
63 Straw v. Visiting Nurse Assn & Hospice, No. 741-10-09 Wrcv., 2010 WL 
2259080 (Vt. Sup. Ct. Jan. 2010).
64 Compare Straw, 2010 WL 2259080 (rulingthatan at-willemployeecan
raise a promissory estoppelclaim ), with Schoffv. Combined Ins. Co., 604
N.W.2d43, 47 (Iowa1999)(rulingthatan at-willemployeeandemployercan
altertherelationshipbyan employeehandbookandtheemployerisboundby
thatagreement).
65 Schoff, 604 N.W.2d at48 (citing Millerv. Lawlor, 66 N.W.2d 267, 272
(Iowa1954)).
66 Id. (citing Huhtala v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 N.W.2d 640, 647 n.16
(Mich. 1977)).
67 Id. at49. TheNebraskaSupremeCourthasrecognizedacauseofaction
forpromissoryestoppelin connection with detrimentalrelianceon apromise
ofat-willemployment, butnotnecessarily in connection with detrimental
reliance on other promises made to an at-willemployee. Blinn v. Beatrice
Cmty. Hosp. & HealthCtr., 708 N.W.2d235, 247 (Neb. 2006).
68 Schoff, 604N.W.2dat48.
69 ChryslerCorp. v. ChaplakeHoldings, Ltd., 822 A.2d1024, 1031 (Del. 2003).
70 Id. at1034.
71 Id. at1032. In Connecticut, promissory estoppelcan alsobepled asan
independent cause of action. Grey v. Greenwich Hills Assn, No. FSTCV13-
6019725S, 2014 WL 1568402, at*4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 20, 2014). The
Supreme Court ofColorado has explained that promissory estoppelis an
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Similarly, courts in Kentucky have recognized promissory es-
toppelas an independentcause ofaction.72 The theory ofthe
action is that detrimental reliancebecomesasubstituteforcon-
sideration in a variety of situations, including the employment 
context, when injustice can be avoided only by giving effectto
the [gratuitous] prom ise.73 The problem , as evidenced in the
Texas Frost case, is that often the party pleading prom issory
estoppelshould have protected him orherselfby entering into
an enforceablecontract.74 Theparty pleading promissory estop-
pelgets to have a distinctadvantage:ifa contractwould not
have been in that partys favor, thenthereisnocontract;butifa
contractwould benefitthatparty, then promissoryestoppelcre-
atescontractualobligations.
II. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL:A CLAIM AT LAW OR IN EQUITY?
Anotherareaofconfusion involveswhethercourtsshouldcate-
gorize a claim ofprom issory estoppelas sounding atlaw orin
equity. Asearlyasthefourteenth century, theEnglish Chancery
granted reliefto a plaintiffwhosuffered detrim entin response
to a defendants failure to perform his reciprocalpromise.75 At
independentcause ofaction. WheatRidge Urban RenewalAuth. v. Corner-
stoneGrp. XXII, LLC, 176 P.3d 737, 741 (Colo. 2007). TheSupremeCourtof
Arkansashasheld thatthereisan independentcauseofaction forpromissory
estoppelordetrimentalreliance. Van Dyke v. Glover, 934 S.W.2d 204, 209
(Ark. 1996). TheArizonaCourtofAppealshasheld thatpromissoryestoppel
can beusedasacauseofaction fordamages. TiffanyInc. v. W. M. K. Transit
Mix, Inc., 493 P.2d1220, 1224(Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).
72 Jackson v. JB HuntTransp., Inc., 384 S.W.3d 177, 184 (Ky. Ct. App.
2012). Indiana alsorecognizespromissory estoppelasan independentcause
ofaction. Biddlev. BAA Indianapolis, LLC, 830 N.E.2d 76, 87 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005). Illinois recognizes promissory estoppelas an independent cause of
action. Newton TractorSales, Inc. v. Kubota TractorCorp., 906 N.E.2d 520,
521 (Ill. 2009)(overruling DeWittv. Fleming, 828 N.E.2d 756, 760 (Ill. Ct.
App. 2005)and LawrenceH. Flynn, Inc. v. Philip MorrisUSA, Inc., No. 05 C
318, 2006-1 TradeCases¶ 75, 141, TradeReg. Rep. (CCH), 2006 WL 6469806
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2006)). Georgiarecognizespromissoryestoppelasan inde-
pendentcause ofaction. Houston v. Houston, 600 S.E.2d 395, 396 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2004).
73 McCarthyv. LouisvilleCartageCo., 796 S.W.2d10, 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
74 See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 8.1 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 2015)[herein-
afterCORBIN ON CONTRACTS].
75 J.B. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1415 (1888). 
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thattim e, thebreach ofa prom isewasviewed asa tortand re-
liefwasgiven in equityforthelossofthethinggiven in reliance
on thepromise.76 Gradually, bytheseventeenth century, English
courtscametoview actionsforbreachesofpromisesascontract
actions, andtheyassesseddam agesforthefailuretoreceivethe
benefit of the prom isors prom ise the promisees expectation in-
terest.77 InrecentyearsintheUnitedStates, thequestionofprom-
issoryestoppelsoundingin law orequityhasbeen addressed by
numerouscourtsin ordertodecidewhetheraplaintiffisentitled
toajuryorwhatremedyisappropriate.
TheSupremeCourtofMinnesotaconcludedthat, inMinnesota,
promissory estoppel derived from the English Chancerys equi-
table cause ofaction based on good-faith reliance; however, 
accordingtothecourt, notallpromissoryestoppelclaimsarenec-
essarily equitable.78 The court said it must focus on the ele-
ments of [the plaintiffs] cause of action, and in the case at hand 
where the plaintiffs cause of action was based on equitable good-
faith reliance, the court concluded that her cause of action was 
equitable in nature, and that she was not entitled to a jury trial.79
TheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheEighthCircuitheard
a casein which a lessoralleged itboughta building in reliance
on the defendants oral promise to lease 25,000 feet of the build-
ing for twenty-five years, and the defendant never followed
through on theprom ise.80 Thelessordemandedajuryin itssuit
to enforce the promise, and the defendantmoved to strike the
jurytrialdem and.81 Thecourtapplied Minnesota law, which re-
quired contractsfora leaseofm orethan oneyeartobein writ-
ing;thus, thelessorhadastatuteoffraudsproblem thatittried
toovercomeusingprom issoryestoppel.82 TheEighth Circuithad
todecidewhetherthelessorhad aSeventh Am endmentrightto
ajurytrial.83 Thecourtreasoned thatpromissoryestoppelcould
76 Id. at15.
77 Id.
78 Olsonv. SynergisticTech. Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d142, 152 (Minn. 2001).
79 Id. at 15253. 
80 Incom pass IT, Inc. v. XO Com m cns Serv., Inc., 719 F.3d 891, 894 (8th 
Cir. 2013).
81 Id. at895.
82 Id.
83 Id. at897.
2016] KILL THE MONSTER 15
be eithera legalclaim oran equitable claim depending on the
context.84 Because the lessorwasusing promissory estoppelto
avoid the statute offrauds, the courtheld thatthe claim was
equitable.85 Moreimportantly, according tothecourt, thelessor
was seeking reliance dam ages as a rem edy;thatis, a remedy
thatwould putitin theposition itwould havebeen in had the
contractnotbeenmade, andreliancedamagesareequitable.86 The
court discounted the lessors apparent claim for expectation 
damages in the form ofrentalincome itwould have received
from thedefendant, had thedefendantkeptitspromisetolease
space.87 Based on theforegoinganalysis, thecourtheld thatthe
lessorwasnotentitled toajurytrial because of the undeniably 
equitable nature of the prom issory estoppel claim as a whole.88
TheUnited StatesDistrictCourtin Nevada, applying Nevada
law, held thata prom issory estoppelclaim exists to provide a
remedyin equitywhen thereisnocontractduetoalack ofcon-
sideration;89 however, ifprom issory estoppelisbeing used asa
substituteforconsideration, itwouldmakesensetoconsiderthe
resultacontractwithalegalremedyforbreach.
On the otherhand, a courtin Pennsylvania thathad to de-
cidewhetheraplaintiffmakingapromissoryestoppelclaim was
entitled to a jury90 decided in the affirm ative,91 although this
reasoning only exemplifiestheconfusion thatoccurswhen courts
attem pttoclassifyprom issoryestoppelasacauseofaction that
sounds atlaw orin equity.92 The Pennsylvania CourtofCom-
mon Pleas first discussed the Pennsylvania Supreme Courts 
recognition oftheequitablebasisofprom issoryestoppel, charac-
terizing it as not so much one of contract.93 Then, the court
84 Id. at896.
85 Id. at897.
86 Id. at898.
87 Id.
88 Id. at899.
89 Duartev. WellsFargoBank, No. 3:13-cv-00371-RCJ-VPC, 2014WL 585802,
at*4(D. Nev. Feb. 14, 2014)(entitlementtoajurywasnotanissueinthiscase).
90 Osborne-DavisTransp. Co. v. MothersWork Inc., No. 02512, 2008 WL
2175580, at*54(Pa. Com. Pl. Feb. 20, 2008).
91 Id. at*59.
92 Id. at *57*58. 
93 Id. at*57.
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cited the Supreme Courts (1) affirming a jury verdict in a prom-
issoryestoppelcase;(2)holdingthatforstatuteoflimitation pur-
poses, promissory estoppelisa breach ofcontractclaim;and (3)
statingthatpromissoryestoppelpermitsan equitableremedytoa
contractdisputeandsoundsincontractlaw.94 Thecourtconcluded
thattheplaintiffwasentitledtoajurybecausetheclaim wasfor
m onetary dam ages only.95 Five years later, the United States
DistrictCourtfortheEastern DistrictofPennsylvania, applying
Pennsylvania law, opined thatpromissory estoppel stops short 
of creating a contract governed by law,96 butthen held thatit
implies a contract in law where no contract exists in fact.97
ItisnowonderthattheMissouriSupremeCourtnoted that
promissory estoppel is not a favorite of the law.98 In a2007 case,
thecourtlistedtheusualelementsofapromissoryestoppelclaim:
theprom isormakesa prom iseexpecting thepromiseeto actin
reliance on itand the promisee relieson itto hisorherdetri-
ment.99 But the court focused on the Restatements additional 
element: a resulting injustice that only enforcement of the prom-
ise could cure.100 Thecourtconcluded thattheplaintiffshad an
availableremedyinlaw throughanegligenceaction, andtherefore
an equitable rem edy forpromissory estoppelwasnotappropri-
ate.101 Severalyearsearlier, a Missouriappellate courtopined
that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is to be used with caution, 
sparinglyandonlyinextrem ecases to avoid unjust results.102
94 Id. at *57*58. 
95 Id. at*60. TheSupremeCourtofPennsylvania hasheld that, because
prom issory estoppel m akes otherwise unenforceable agreem ents binding, the 
doctrine sounds in contract law. Crouse v. Cyclops Indus., 745 A.2d 606, 610 
(Pa. 2000).
96 I.K. v. Sch. Dist. ofHaverfordTwp., 961 F. Supp. 2d674, 690 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
97 Id. at702.
98 Clevengerv. OliverIns. Agency, Inc., 237 S.W.3d588, 590 (Mo. 2007).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at591.
102 MidwestEnergyv. OrionFoodSys., Inc. 14S.W.3d154, 165 (Mo. Ct. App.
2000);see also Meinhold v. Huang, 687 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(noting that the doctrine of prom issory estoppel has been resorted to in 
Missouri in extrem e cases and only to avoid unjust results and giving as 
examplescasesin which formeremployeessued torecoverlifetimepensions
promisedtothem iftheyretired).
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Courtshavealsograppledwith appropriateremediesin promis-
soryestoppelcaseswhen therighttoajurywasnotan issue. The
AlabamaSuprem eCourthasheldthatcourtsshouldaward reli-
ancedamagesin promissoryestoppelcases, limitedbytheamount
thatwould be recoverable in an action for breach ofcontract,
because promissory estoppelplaintiffs should notbe in better
positionsthan iftheyhad been abletorecoverforbreach ofcon-
tract.103 The courtwasreluctantto award specificperformance
in promissory estoppelactions because specific performance, al-
though an equitable rem edy, satisfies the expectation interest,
and theplaintiffwould bereceiving thebenefitofthebargain in-
steadofdamagesresultingfrom relianceonabroken prom ise.104
Ifthelaw m adeitclearthatpromissory estoppelwasa sub-
stituteforconsideration in thelimitedcircumstancewhen aprom-
iseereliestotheirdetrimenton promisesthatapromisorknows
willinduceaction bythepromisee, theresultwouldbean enforce-
ablecontractwhich would permitthenon-breaching party tocol-
lectdamagesbasedon theirexpectation interestsandhavetheir
casedecidedbyajury. Muchoftheconfusionwouldbeeliminated.
III. THE COMMON LAW EXPANSION OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
Section 90 oftheRestatem entofContracts(1932)statesthat
[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to in-
duceaction orforbearanceof a definite and substantial character
on thepartoftheprom iseeandwhich doesinducesuch action or
forbearance is binding ifinjustice can be avoided only by en-
forcement of the prom ise.105
ThecommentsontheRestatement(Second)ofContracts(1981)
note that Section 90 is often referred to in terms of promissory 
estoppel.106 Section 90 says:
A promisewhich thepromisorshouldreasonablyexpecttoin-
duceactionorforbearanceonthepartofthepromiseeorathird
person and which does induce such action orforbearance is
bindingifinjusticecan beavoided onlybyenforcementofthe
103 Wyattv. BellSouth, Inc., 757 So.2d403, 408 (Ala. 2000).
104 Id.
105 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §90 (1932)(emphasisadded).
106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §90 cmt. a(1981).
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promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as
justicerequires.107
The six words in the originalRestatem ent that were deleted
from theSecondareagoodindication ofthedirection courtshad
taken in the fifty yearsbetween them, and continue to take to
thisday.108 By1981, any action taken bya promisee(notneces-
sarilyadefiniteandsubstantialaction)in responsetoaprom ise
theprom isorshould haveknown would induceaction createsan
enforceable contract, ifnon-enforcementwould seem unfair.109
Instead of an easily applied rule about consideration, courts
substitutedanadhocfactualdecisionaboutinjustice.110
In 1966, an appellate courtin New Jersey, noting thatno
courtin New Jersey had applied the doctrineofprom issory es-
toppel, quotedaNew JerseySupremeCourtJustice:
Thelaw shouldbebasedoncurrentconceptsofwhatisrightand
justand thejudiciary should bealerttothenever-ending need
for keeping its common law principles abreastofthe times.
Ancient distinctions which m ake no sense in todays society 
andtendtodiscreditthelaw shouldbereadilyrejected.111
Although itwould m ake no sense to argue thatthe law should
never change, butshould adhere to rules no longer usefulin
m odern society, substitutingvaguenotionsoffairnessforeasily
understood rules for transactions between businesspeople does
notadvancethelaw. Onceyou godown thepath ofelim inating
theconsideration requirem enton thegroundsofjustice, itisnot
difficultto eliminate the statute offrauds as wellin order to
mete outjustice.112 For exam ple, the Restatem ent(Second)of
Contractsin section139 providesthat:
107 Id. §90.
108 Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST)OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932), with RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §90 (1981).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 E. A. CoronisAssocs. v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 216 A.2d246, 251 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966)(citingJacobs, J. in Schipperv. Levitt& Sons, 207
A.2d314, 325 (N.J. 1965)).
112 Arguments are made supporting the elimination ofthe doctrine of
consideration and the statute offrauds, butthatdiscussion is beyond the
scope ofthis paper, which assumes thatboth remain basic tenets ofU.S.
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[a]promise which the promisorshould reasonably expectto
induceaction orforbearanceon thepartofthepromiseeora
thirdperson andwhich doesinducetheaction orforbearanceis
enforceablenotwithstandingtheStatuteofFraudsifinjustice
canbeavoidedonlybyenforcementofthepromise.113
IV. WEAKENING THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
In 1997, theSupremeCourtofAlaska, in acaseoffirstimpres-
sion, notedthatthepurposeofthestatuteoffraudsistoprevent
fraud, not to be an escape route for persons seeking to avoid
obligations.114 Thecourtquoted ArthurCorbin, therealistchief
reporteroftheRestatement(Second)ofContracts, assertingin1950
that many courts are now prepared to use promissory estoppel
to overcome the requirements of the statute of frauds, and joined 
the approach of those courts in employment disputes.115 The
plaintiffin thecasewasan experienced executivein theDem o-
craticPartywhosued on an alleged oralcontractfora two-year
executive directors job that failed to materialize.116 Shewasnotan
contract law. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
InternationalSale ofGoods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (stating thata
contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing); Law 
Reform (EnforcementofContracts)Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c.34, § 1 (Eng.)
(eliminatingconsideration requirementformostcontractsinUnitedKingdom);
BarryHough & Ann Spowart-Taylor, The Doctrine of Consideration: Dead or
Alive in English Employment Contracts?, 17 J. CONT. L. 193 (2001)(notingthat
in English em ployment law, the classical doctrine of consideration is falling 
intodesuetudeandnolongerconvincinglyexplainsthedistinction between non-
enforceable from  enforceable obligations); Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of
Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM
L. REV. 39, 42 (1974)(acknowledgingcriticswhoarguethatstatuteoffrauds
shouldbeeliminated);Significant Changes in the Proposed Revision of Article 2
on Sales, SB29 ALI-ABA 143 (1996) (noting proposal to UCC § 2201 to elimi-
natestatuteoffraudsforcontractsforgoods).
113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §139 (1981).
114 Alaska DemocraticParty v. Rice, 934 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Alaska 1997)
(citingEavenson v. LewisMeans, Inc., 105 N.M. 161, 730 P.2d 464, 465 (1986),
overruled on other grounds by StrataProd. Co. v. MercuryExpl. Co., 121 N.M.
622, 916 P.2d822 (1996)).
115 Id. But see Stephen J. Leacock, Fingerprints of Equitable Estoppel and
Promissory Estoppel on the Statute of Frauds in Contract Law, 2 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REV. 73, 117 (2011) (asserting that [c]ourts have generally not 
allowed a promissoryestoppelclaim todefeata StatuteofFraudsdefensein
the em ploym ent context). 
116 Alaska Democratic Party, 934P.2dat1315.
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inexperienced noviceworkeroran unsophisticated consumer.117
Any first-yearbusinesslaw studentknowsthata contractthat
cannotbeperformed within oneyearmustbein writingtobeen-
forceable.118 Ifthatruleisappliedonlywhenthereisafraud, then
itbecomesreduced totheam assing ofevidencetoindicatethat
therewasindeedanoralcontract;thatis, noruleatall, evenifthe
evidence required is characterized as clear and convincing.119
In 2012, theSupremeCourtofAlaskaextendeditspromissory
estoppelexception to the statute offrauds in holding thatthe
exception could apply in a land sale case.120 In thatcase, both
partieswerebusinessowners,121 notunsophisticatedconsumers,
who should have known to protectthemselvesby putting their
agreementin writing. Furthermore, the courtgratuitously al-
lowed the possible application ofprom issory estoppelwhen the
sam eresultcould have been achieved by theapplication ofthe
partperformanceexception tothestatuteoffrauds.122 Thelatter
isam uch m orelimitedexception.
In 2007, theUnitedStatesDistrictCourtin Kansascitedthe
KansasSupremeCourtfortheproposition thatpromissoryestop-
pelcan overcome the statute offraudsifthe application ofthe
statute of frauds would work a fraud or a gross injustice upon the 
prom isee.123 In fact, both partiesin thatcasewereexperienced
companies:one, a supplierofcomputerhardwareforpoint-of-sale
system s;the other, a selleroffood service technology solutions
to schools throughout the country.124 Therefore, it is hard to
understand why these companies could notprotectthemselves
in writtencontractsabsentanymisrepresentationsoffact.
In 2001, the Supreme CourtofSouth Dakota asserted that
the statuteoffraudswillnotbeused towork an injustice, and
117 See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note74, §19.1
118 See id. §19.1.
119 Alaska Democratic Party, 934 P.2d at1317. More than 40 yearsago,
Professor Perillo asserted that a requirement of clear and convincing evidence 
[should] be substituted for the writing requirem ent to do justice without 
technical and artificial rules. Perillo, supra note112, at82.
120 Kiernanv. Creech, 268 P.3d312, 314, 316 (Alaska2012).
121 Id. at314.
122 Id. at 31718. 
123 School-LinkTech., Inc. v. AppliedRes., Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d1101, 1114(D.
Kan. 2007) (citing Decatur Co-op. Assn v. Urban, 547 P.2d 323, 329 (Kan. 1976)). 
124 Id. at1106.
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affirmed a lower courts ruling that promissory estoppel removed 
an agreementfrom thestatuteoffrauds.125 Itwasclearin this
casethatthetrialcourtfound theplaintiffassertingpromissory
estoppelto be a much m ore sym pathetic witness than the de-
fendant.126 ButtheSouth Dakotacourthadahistoryofallowing
promissoryestoppeltoovercomeastatuteoffraudsdefense.127
In Duarte v. Wells Fargo Bank,128 the courtheld thatunder
Nevadalaw, thestatuteoffraudscannotbeadefensetoaprom -
issory estoppelclaim because the statute offrauds applies to
contracts, and promissory estoppelexistsonly when thereisno
contract.129 Sim ilarly, the United StatesDistrictCourtin New
Hampshireheld thatunderNew Ham pshirelaw, thestatuteof
fraudsisnota barto a promissory estoppelclaim because the
statuteoffraudsappliestocontractsand a prom issory estoppel
claim isbased on theabsenceofacontract.130 An ArkansasCourt
ofAppealshasheld thatprom issory estoppelcan defeata stat-
uteoffraudsdefense.131
TheSupremeCourtofWyominghasalsoheldthatpromissory
estoppelcan beused toenforcean oralpromisethatfallswithin
thestatuteoffrauds.132 Thecourtrecognized promissory estop-
pelasboth a defense and a cause ofaction.133 The courtdown-
playedtheim portanceofthestatuteoffraudsbyassertingthat,
unlike thedifficulty seventeenth century English courtshad in
detecting perjury, modern courtsarecapableofdiscoveringper-
jury.134 The courtdid notconsider the value ofthe statute of
125 Jacobson v. Gulbransen, 623 N.W.2d 84, 9091 (S.D. 2001). 
126 Id. at88.
127 See, e.g., FarmersElevatorCo. v. Lyle, 238 N.W.2d290, 293 (S.D. 1976).
128 Duarte v. WellsFargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:13-cv-00371-RCJ-VPC, 2014
WL 585802, at*3 (D. Nev. Feb. 14, 2014).
129 Id.
130 See, e.g., GE MobileWater, Inc. v. Red DesertReclamation, LLC, 6 F.
Supp. 3d 195, 202 (D.N.H. 2014);Embreev. Bank ofN.Y. Mellon, No. 12-cv-
462-JL, 2013 WL 6384776, at*5 (D.N.H. Dec. 6, 2013).
131 CountryCornerFood& Drug, Inc. v. Reiss, 737 S.W.2d672, 674(Ark. 1987).
132 B & W Glass, Inc. v. WeatherShieldMfg., Inc., 829 P.2d809, 809 (Wyo.
1992).
133 Id. at813.
134 Id. at819.
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frauds in promoting certainty, clarity, and seriousness ofpur-
pose, inaddition todiscouragingperjury.135
A Californiacourtofappealasserted in 1988 thatnoCalifor-
niacasehaddirectlyallowedthedoctrineofpromissoryestoppel
to actasan exception to the statute offraudsprovision in the
CaliforniaUniform CommercialCode.136 However, sincethattime,
therehavebeen casesin which courtshaveinterpreted California
law asallowing claimsofprom issory estoppeltoovercom estat-
ute offraudsrequirem entsto avoid injustice when detrim ental
reliance has caused unconscionable injury.137 Unconscionable
injury m ay sound like a high bar, and itisa high barin som e
states,138 buttheCalifornia courtofappealdefined itm erelyas
the injury resulting from denying enforcement of a contract after 
oneparty isinduced by anotherparty toseriously change posi-
tion relying upon the oral agreement.139 Thismerely soundslike
theusualinjurythatwouldresultfrom abreach ofcontract.140
An outstanding example of a courts using a m istaken notion 
ofjusticetoignorethestatuteoffraudsinfavorofsupportingan
allegationofpromissoryestoppeloccurredinHawaiiin2013.141 The
United StatesDistrictCourtin Hawaiicited a HawaiiSuprem e
Courtopinion thatquotedsection 139 oftheRestatement(Second)
ofContractsfortheproposition thatthestatuteoffraudsisnot
an automaticbartotheenforcementofan oralcontractforthe
135 Current Legislation, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 206, 207 (1929)(giving reason
forrequiringwritingforcontractenforceability, inadditiontoavoidingperjury,
encouragingthoughtfulness).
136 Allied Grape Growersv. Bronco Wine Co., 203 Cal. App. 3d 432, 442
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
137 See, e.g., Siam NumhongProds. Co. v. Eastimpex, 866 F. Supp. 445, 448
(N.D. Cal. 1994)(allegedUCC contractinvolvingwildbambooshoots);Peterson v.
Bank ofAm., N.A., No. 09cv2570-WQH-CAB, 2010 WL 1881070, at*6 (alleged
agreementforloanpayoff);Rijhwaniv. WellsFargoHomeMortg., Inc., No. C 13-
05881 LB, 2014WL 890016, at*12 (allegedagreementforloanmodification).
138 See Robinsv. Zwirner, 713 F. Supp. 2d367, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)(citing
Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1994))
(theNew York definition ofunconscionableinjuryforthepurposeofallowing
promissoryestoppeltoovercomeastatuteoffraudswritingrequirement).
139 Allied Grape Growers, 203 Cal. App. 3dat444.
140 Id.
141 Au v. Republic State Mortg. Co., No. CIV. 11-00251 JMS, 2013 WL
1339738, at*5 (D. Haw. Mar. 29, 2013).
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purchaseofland.142 Thedistrictcourtnotedthattheplaintiffas-
serting promissory estoppelhad practiced law forforty-twoyears,
understoodrealestatecontracts, knew what he was doing, and 
admitted that he was absolutely ... fam iliarwith thestatuteof
frauds.143 Nevertheless, based on the plaintiffs allegation that 
the defendantorally agreed to change the termsofa note and
mortgage, the courtdenied the defendants summ ary judgm ent 
motion to dismiss the prom issory estoppelcount.144 This case
indicatesthefragilityofastatuteoffrauds, resultingin thecre-
ation of great uncertainty in undertaking contractual obliga-
tions. Itsuggeststhatthelaw willprotectthosewhodonotprotect
themselvesinspiteofsophisticatedknowledgeaboutbusinessand
thelaw.145
TheNew York CourtofAppealshasheldthatthedoctrineof
promissory estoppeldoesnotprecludeusing thestatuteoffrauds
asan affirmativedefensetotheenforcem entofan orallease.146
In New York, promissory estoppelcan theoretically overcom e
thestatuteoffrauds, butitismoredifficultthan in otherstates
because the promisee m ustdemonstrate notm erely a grossin-
justicebutalsounconscionableinjury.147 TheUnited StatesCourt
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has defined an unconsciona-
ble injury as beyond that which flows naturally ... from the non-
perform ance of the unenforceable agreem ent, and a greater 
injury than onethatis... predictableand ... theconsequencesof
the [promisees] own choice[ ].148 Thisisa much higherstandard
than theonethathasbeen appliedin California.149
The SuperiorCourtin Connecticut, relying in parton New
Yorks allowing prom issory estoppelto overcom e the statute of
142 Id. at*4(citingMcIntoshv. Murphy, 469 P.2d177, 179, 181 (Haw. 1970)).
143 Id. at*5.
144 Id. at*7.
145 Id.
146 Cohenv. Brown, Harris, Stevens, Inc., 64N.Y.2d728, 747 (1984).
147 Robins v. Zwirner, 713 F. Supp. 2d 367, 37677 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). But see
ArthurB. Schwartz, The Second Circuit Estopped: There Is No Promissory 
Estoppel in New York, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1201, 1233 (1997)(arguing that,
asof1997, theNew York CourtofAppealshadneverrecognizedthedoctrine
ofpromissoryestoppel).
148 713 F. Supp. 2d at377 (quoting Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys.,
Inc., 29 F.3d821, 827 (2dCir. 1994)).
149 Id.
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fraudswhen thereisevidenceofunconscionableinjury, allowedthe
plaintiffs promissory estoppel claim to go forward, and concluded 
that [p]arties will stillhavean incentivetoreduceagreem ents
to writing because enforcing a written contracton a theory of
breach ofcontractwilllikely be much easierthan enforcing an
oral prom ise on a theory of promissory estoppel.150 Theplaintiff
in thiscasewasa full-serviceenergy com panythathad been in
businessformorethan twenty-fiveyears, hadafleetofoverfifty
vehicles, more than sixty employees, and licensesto operate in
twelve states.151 The plaintiffclaim ed thatthe defendanthad
orderedheatingoilon thephoneandthedefendantprocuredthe
heatingoilthesameday, butthedefendanthadneversignedan
agreem entandthen refusedtopay.152 Thisexperiencedbusiness
plaintiffcouldhaveprotecteditselfbyrequiringasignedwriting
before starting to act.153 The Connecticut courts action encour-
agessloppybusinesspracticeandunnecessarylitigation. Ifsome
fraud were involved or the defendants actions were unconsciona-
ble, there would be othermeansofdealing with those problems
withoutallowingprom issoryestoppeltoovertakeotheraccepted
contractdoctrines.
Noteverycourthasseen thewisdom ofallowingthedoctrine
ofprom issory estoppelto overcom e the statute offrauds. The
United StatesDistrictCourtin Maineopined thatifsection 139
ofthe Restatement(Second)ofContracts (allowing the avoid-
anceofinjusticetoovercomethestatuteoffrauds)weretobeap-
plied to Maines statute of frauds or probate statute, both would be 
rendered unenforceable.154 The court offered that it could al-
waysbesaidthatinjusticewillresultifthepromiseuponwhich a
promisee has relied is not fulfilled.155 TheMaineSuprem eJudi-
cialCourthaddeclinedtoallow prom issoryestoppeltoovercome
150 E. RiverEnergy, Inc. v. Gaylord Hosp., Inc., No. NNHCV095029078S,
2011 WL 3198251, at*9 (Conn. Super. Ct. June15, 2011)(citingAllied Grape
Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 203 Cal. App. 3d432, 432 (Ct. App. 1988)).
151 EAST RIVER ENERGY, Corporate History, http://www.eastriverenergy.com
/about-us/corporate-history/[http://perma.cc/S3YR-GAYX].
152 East River Energy, Inc., 2011 WL 3198251, at *1*2. 
153 Id.
154 Robinson v. Miller, No. 2:11-CV-56-JHR, 2011 WL 2610193, at *56 (D. 
Me. June30, 2011).
155 Id. at*6.
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the statute offrauds in em ploymentcontracts thatcannotbe
perform edwithin oneyear.156 TheMainecourtsaid:
[a]lthough section 139 of the Restatement may promote
justicein othersituations, in theemploymentcontextitcon-
travenesthe policy ofthe Statute to preventfraud. Itistoo
easyforadisgruntled formerem ployeetoallegerelianceon a
promise, butdifficultfactuallytodistinguish such reliancefrom
theordinarypreparationsthatattendanynew employment.157
Notwithstanding the Supreme Judicial Courts absolute state-
mentin the employmentcontext, itdid allow a promissory es-
toppelclaim toproceedin acaseinvolvingtheenforcementofan
oralpromisetosign arealpropertycontractthatwouldhavebeen
unenforceableunderthestatuteoffrauds.158 In 2014, in aprom -
issory estoppelcase concerning the Uniform Comm ercialCode
Statute ofFrauds, the United States CourtofAppeals for the
First Circuit concluded that the Maine court was seek[ing] a 
middlecoursebetween an outrightbaron theuseofpromissory
estoppelon one hand and the wholesale use ofthe doctrine to
evade the Statute on the other.159
TheFlorida Suprem eCourtspecifically refused to allow the
statuteoffraudstobeovercomebyprom issoryestoppel.160 Itas-
sertedthatthestatuteoffraudsshouldbestrictlyconstruedvis-
à-vis the doctrine ofprom issory estoppelso that parties to a
contract can fully understand or be advised of their rights and 
obligations.161 An Arizona appellatecourtheld thatprom issory
estoppelcannotbeusedtoovercomethestatuteoffraudsbecause
holdingotherwisewouldrenderthestatuteoffraudsofnoeffect.162
156 Stearnsv. Emery-WaterhouseCo., 596 A.2d72 (Me. 1991).
157 Id. at 7475. 
158 Chapmanv. Bomann, 381 A.2d1123, 1129 (Me. 1978).
159 Packgenv. BP Exploration& Prod., Inc., 754F.3d61, 73 (1stCir. 2014).
160 Tanenbaum v. Biscayne OsteopathicHosp., Inc., 190 So. 2d 777, 779
(Fla. 1966).
161 ShoreHoldings, Inc. v. SeagateBeach Quarters, Inc., 842 So. 2d 1010,
101213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Yates v. Ball, 181 So. 341 (Fla. 1938) 
andW.R. Grace& Co. v. GeodateServ., Inc., 547 So. 2d919, 925 (Fla. 1989)).
See also Farm CreditofNw. Fla., ACA v. Easom PeanutCo., 718 S.E.2d590, 602
(Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (asserting that, under Florida Law, a party may not circum-
vent the requirements of the statute of frauds by alleging promissory estoppel). 
162 TiffanyInc. v. W. M. K. TransitMix, Inc., 493 P.2d 1220, 1226 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1972).
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In Tennessee, prom issory estoppelisnotan exception tothe
statuteoffrauds.163 Nevertheless, onecom m entatorhasargued
that, because the Tennessee Supreme Courthasrecognized ex-
ceptionstothestatuteoffraudswhen enforcingthestatutewould
perpetrate a fraud, it would be only an incremental change in 
Tennessee law for prom issory estoppel to override the statute, 
aswell.164 Tothecontrary, theTennesseeCourtofAppealshas
called the statute of frauds a venerable rule of law and has 
noted that the Tennessee Suprem e Courts m ore restrictive 
view, limiting application of promissory estoppel to exceptional 
caseswhere to enforce the statute offraudswould make itan
instrument of hardship and oppression, verging on actual fraud.165
In fact, nostatewillenforcea statuteoffraudstoabetfraud,166
so a defense offraud orunconscionability orequitable estoppel
isalwaysavailabletoenforcean oralprom ise.167 Itonlycreates
am biguityand uncertaintytoallow aclaim ofprom issoryestop-
peltoovercomeastatuteoffrauds.
Texascourtshavedecided many promissory estoppelcases.168
Since the 2009 econom ic downturn, m any ofthese cases have
involved mortgageforeclosuresand homeownersalleging prom-
isesm adeby lenders.169 In Martin-Janson v. JP Morgan Chase
Bank,170 forexample, thehom eownerreceived a foreclosureno-
tice after m issing two consecutive m onthly payments.171 She
163 Launiusv. WellsFargo Bank, No. 3:09-CV-501, 2010 WL 3429666, at
*6 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 27, 2010).
164 Steven W. Feldman, Avoidance of Requirements-Promissory Estoppel,
21 TENN. PRAC. CONTRACT L. & PRAC. §2:33 (2014).
165 Shedd v. Gaylord Entmt Co., 118 S.W.3d 695, 697, 700 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2003).
166 See, e.g., S. States Dev. Co. v. Robinson, 494 S.W.2d 777, 78182 (1972) 
(citingHackneyv. Hackney, 27 Tenn. 452, 8 Hum. 452 (1847)).
167 Id.
168 See, e.g., TrammelCrow Co. v. Harkinson, 944S.W.3d 631 (Tex. 1997);
English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983);Naglev. Nagle, 633 S.W.2d
796 (Tex. 1982).
169 See, e.g., Martin-Janson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 536 Fed. Appx 
394 (5th Cir. 2013); Franco v. U.S. Bank Natl Assn, No. SA-14-CV-636-XR, 
2014WL 4441224(W.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2014);Hayesv. Bank ofAm., N.A., No.
4:13-CV-760-A, 2014 WL 308129 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2014);Moore v. Fed.
Natl Mortgage Assn, No. H-12-1518, 2012 WL 6048999 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2012). 
170 536 Fed. Appx 394 (5th Cir. 2013). 
171 Id. at395.
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then had m any com municationswith thelender, whoallegedly
told herthatherreceiptofaloan m odification wasim minent.172
After about two years of the lenders alleged assurances that a 
modification wasforthcom ing, thehom eownerreceived a form al
notice of acceleration and trustees sale, and she filed lawsuits 
challenging the foreclosure on the basisofpromissory estoppel
aswellasothercausesofaction.173 Texashasastatuteoffrauds
forloan agreem entsin excessoffifty thousand dollars, and the
United StatesDistrictCourtforthe Western DistrictofTexas
concluded that the homeowners claims were barred by the statute 
offrauds.174 Texashasan unusualrule fortherelationship be-
tween thedoctrineofpromissoryestoppelandthestatuteoffrauds.
Generally, the doctrine willnotovercom e the statute;however,
thedoctrinewillprevailiftheallegedpromiseismerelytosign an
already existing written agreem entthatwould satisfy thestat-
ute.175 TheCourtofAppealsfortheFifth Circuitoverturned the
districtcourtbecausethehomeowneralleged that, based on the
lenders repeated assertions that herreceiptofaloan modification
wasimminent, shebelieved thattheloan modification agreement
had been prepared butnever sentto her.176 The Fifth Circuit
held thattheagreementwould satisfythestatuteoffraudsand
thehomeownercouldproceedwithherpromissoryestoppelclaim.177
In contrast, in anothercasein which ahomeownerfacingfore-
closurefornon-paym entbroughtan action forprom issoryestop-
pelbased on an alleged oralm odification agreement, theUnited
StatesDistrictCourtfortheWestern DistrictofTexasheld that
the homeowners reliance on oral representations made by the 
lenderwasunreasonableasamatteroflaw.178 Thedistrictcourt
cited a Texasappellatecourtforthe proposition that [a] party 
to an arm s length transaction m ustexerciseordinary careand
reasonablediligencefortheprotection ofhisown interests, and
afailuretodosoisnotexcusedbymereconfidencein thehonesty
172 Id. at 39596. 
173 Id. at396.
174 Id. at 39697. 
175 Davidson v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A., No. 4:13-CV-3698, 2014WL 4924128,
at*8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2014).
176 536 Fed. Appx at 399. 
177 Id.
178 Montalvov. BankofAm. Corp., No. SA-10-CV-360-XR, 2013 WL 870088,
at*13 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2013).
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and integrity of the other party.179 Thecourtnotedthattheplain-
tiffwasnotunsophisticated aboutfinancialmattersbecause she
was a m anagerofa large pawn shop and had been trained in
Texaslendinglaws.180 Moreover, theloan agreem entspecifically
prohibited oral modifications and under Texas law   reliance on 
an oralstatem ent is unreasonable as a m atter oflaw ifthe
statem ent is controverted by the plain language ofa binding
written contract.181
TheSupremeCourtoftheStateofWashington hasspecifically
declined to allow prom issory estoppelto overcome a valid de-
fensebased on thestatuteoffraudsin theUniform Com m ercial
Code.182 Thecourtemphasizedtheimportanceofuniformityamong
thestatesasaprimepurposeoftheUniform CommercialCode.183
Itviewed enforcingthestatuteoffraudsasawaytolimitlitiga-
tion and confusion.184 The Washington Supreme Courtalso re-
fused toallow thepromissory estoppeldoctrinetoovercomethe
statute offraudsin a wrongfultermination case,185 a franchise
agreementcase,186 and aconsultingcase.187 Lastyear, theUnit-
edStatesDistrictCourtfortheWestern DistrictofWashington,
applying Washington law, noted on severaloccasions thatthe
Washington SupremeCourthasconsistentlydeclined toallow a
prom issoryestoppelclaim toavoidthestatuteoffrauds.188
V. ENCOURAGING CONFUSION AND LITIGATION
NorthCarolinaprobablyhasthemostrestrictivelaw governing
prom issoryestoppelam ongstatesthatrecognizethedoctrine.189
179 Id. at*12 (citingDRC Parts& Accessories, LLC v. VM Motori, S.P.A.,
112 S.W.3d854, 858 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003)).
180 Id. at*14.
181 Id.
182 LigeDicksonCo. v. UnionOilCo., 635 P.2d103, 107 (Wash. 1981).
183 Id. (citingUCC §1-102(2)(c)).
184 Id.
185 Greaves v. Med. Im aging Sys., Inc., 879 P.2d 276, 28283 (Wash. 1994). 
186 Klinkev. FamousRecipeFriedChicken, Inc., 616 P.2d644(Wash. 1980).
187 Lectus, Inc. v. Rainier Natl Bank, 647 P.2d 1001 (Wash. 1982). 
188 Rutherford v. Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2:13-cv-01175-MJP, 2014 WL
4540066, at*4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2014);Nicholson v. Thrifty Payless,
Inc., No. C12-1121RSL, 2014WL 618894, at*2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 18, 2014).
189 HomeElec. Co. ofLenoir, Inc. v. Hall& Underdown Heating& AirCon-
ditioningCo., 358 S.E.2d539, 541 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
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North Carolina courtshave neverrecognized promissory estop-
pelasasubstituteforconsideration.190 Theonlycircumstancein
which North Carolina courtshaverecognized promissoryestoppel
is as a defense involving the waiver of a preexisting legal
right.191 Forexam ple, in Wachovia Bank v. Rubish,192 a tenant
relied on his landlords prom ise nottorequirewritten noticeto
renew hislease.193 Thetenantasserted prom issoryestoppelasa
defense when, after the landlords death, the landlords executors 
broughtan action for summ ary ejectment.194 The courtstated
thata promissoryestoppeltheoryofthecaseispossiblebased on
the landlords waiver of two prior breaches of the condition of 
written notice, and the defendants reliance on the promise implied 
from thesewaiversthatnowritten noticewouldberequired.195
The North Carolina CourtofAppeals chastised the United
StatesCourtofAppealsfortheFourth Circuitforholding that,
under North Carolina law, prom issory estoppelcould be used
affirm atively in a construction bid case toallow the plaintiffto
recover the difference between the price of the defendants oral 
bid and the price the plaintiffhad to pay when the defendant
was unable to deliver.196 The court opined that [a]llowing a 
causeofaction basedon prom issoryestoppelin construction bid-
ding   creates the potential for injustice.197 A contractorcan use
a subcontractors bid to get a job, butisnotobligatedtousethat
subcontractor while, under a promissory estoppeltheory, the
subcontractorwillbebound toactin accordancewith hisorher
bid.198 Mostimportantly, contractorscanprotectthemselvesbycon-
tractingwith subcontractorsdependentupon asuccessfulbid.199
190 Id.
191 Id. at 54142. 
192 293 S.E.2d749 (N.C. 1982).
193 Id. at751.
194 Id.
195 Id. at757.
196 Home Elec. Co., 358 S.E.2dat542.
197 Id.
198 Id. at542. But see Newton TractorSales, Inc. v. KubotaTractorCorp.,
906 N.E.2d 520, 527 (Ill. 2009) (asserting the courts conviction that prom-
issory estoppelasan independentcause ofaction willnotnegatively affect
relationshipbetweensubcontractorsandgeneralcontractors).
199 Home Elec. Co., 358 S.E.2dat542.
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Differencesin opinion aboutpromissoryestoppelbetween state
courts and federalcourts applying the sam e state law are not
limitedtoNorth Carolina.200 Thisvariation in approach, in addi-
tion tothedifferencesamong states, isfurtherindication ofthe
difficulty in com ing to terms about what promissory estoppel
actually meansand whatitshould accomplish. TheUnited States
DistrictCourtin South Carolina held thatprom issory estoppel
could notbeused toavoid theUniform Comm ercial Codes stat-
uteoffrauds, becausetohold otherwisewould renderthestatute
a nullity.201 Twoyearslater, theSouthCarolinaCourtofAppeals
heldthatpromissoryestoppelcan overcom ethestatuteoffrauds
in South Carolina.202 However, itmayberelevantthatthedefend-
antassertingthestatuteoffraudswasaNew Yorkresidentwho
orderedsilveroverthephonefrom aSouth Carolinacom pany.203
Thecom pany purchased thesilver and awaited the defendants 
payment.204 The price ofthe silver went down by about two-
thirds, and the defendantrefused to pay.205 The company sued
thedefendant, allegingpromissoryestoppel.206 Thisisthekindof
surmise thatbecomesavailable when courtsare deciding cases
basedon adhocnotionsofjustice.
A databasecounseling on how tolitigatewrongfuldischarge
casesadvisesthata promissory estoppelclaim should almostal-
ways be advanced as a backup to a breach of contract claim .207
First, apromissoryestoppelclaim maysucceed whereabreach of
contractwouldnotwhen an employermakespromisesthatwere
notsupportedbyanybargained-forconsiderationonthepartofthe
employee;208 andsecond, apromissoryestoppelclaim maysucceed
whenanoralprom isewouldnotbeenforceablebecauseitdidnot
200 See generally McDabcov. ChetAdamsCo., 548 F. Supp. 456 (D.S.C. 1982).
201 McDabco, 548 F. Supp. at 46061. 
202 Atl. WholesaleCo. v. Solondz, 320 S.E.2d720, 723 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984).
The court inquired whether equitable estoppel could overcom e the statute of 
frauds, butthesituationinthecaseclearlyinvolvedpromissoryestoppel. Id.
203 Id. at 72223. 
204 Id. at723.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 PaulH. Tobias, 1 Litigating WrongfulDischarge Claims § 4.38 (June
2015), available at WestlawNextLabor& Employm entTexts& Treatises.
208 Id.
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satisfy the statute offrauds.209 The advice warnsthatthe draw-
backsincludethattheemployeemustbeabletoprovedetrimental
reliance, and the remedy may be restricted to reliance damages
forexam ple, m oving expenses, new housing costs, and suspen-
sion of prior income rather than expectation dam ages based on 
an alleged contract.210 When getting around long-known, tradi-
tionalcontractruleshasbecome the norm alway ofconducting
business, perhapsitistime to admitthattort-like principlesare
overcomingcontractrules, andthatitistimeforreform.
CONCLUSION
In considering an independentcause ofaction forprom is-
soryestoppel, thechoicesare:(1)allowingcourtstom akeadhoc
decisionsaboutwhatisandisnotfairin situationsin which par-
tiescouldhaveenteredintoenforceablecontractsbutdidnot;or
(2)expectingexperiencedbusinesspeopletoprotectthemselvesby
adheringtotraditionalcontractrules. Thefirstchoicemaybesuit-
ablein limitedcircumstances, such asallowingpromissoryestop-
peltoactasa substituteforconsideration in domesticsituations
when particularlyunsophisticated consumersorhomeownersare
involved. The second choice is the one that is appropriate in
businesssituations. Businesspeopleshould beabletorelyon pre-
dictablerulesandprofessionallegaladvice, andshouldnotbeat
themercyofvagueclaimsofunfairnessand injustice. Business-
peopleshould alsobeexpected toknow basiccontractrulesand
when togetexpertlegaladvice.
Therewillalwaysbebusinessesthatwillconducthandshake
deals. Thatdoesnotmean thatthosedealsshouldbeenforced if
theydonotsatisfystatuteoffraudsrequirem ents. Itmeansthat
such businesses have to understand the risks they are taking,
knowing thatsom etim estheirdealcounterpartswillnothonor
such handshake deals. Thatfactshould becom e partofthe as-
sessmentofbusinesscosts, risks, and insuranceneeds. When the
assertion it isnt fair can overcome traditional contract rules, 
allbusinessesincuradditionallitigation risksthatarevery un-
predictable. Statelegislaturescan curetheconfusion, unpredict-
ability, andlack ofuniform ityacrosscourtsbyenactingstatutes
209 Id.
210 Id.
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thatdefineprom issory estoppelasonly a substitute forconsid-
eration, which createsan enforceable contractwhen a promise
which thepromisorshould reasonablyexpecttoinduceaction or
forbearanceon thepartofthepromiseedoesinducesuch action
orforbearancetothedetrim entof the prom isee. If a promisors 
behaviorisoutrageously unfairtoan unsophisticated consumer
orhomeowner, courtscan deem thebehaviorunconscionableand
remedy the situation withoutresorting to the confounding doc-
trineofprom issoryestoppel.
